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VOL. 7, ISSUE 3 (2025)
Constitutional amendments and federal balance: A comparative analysis of India, Canada, and South Africa
Authors
Mazhar Khan, Dr. Anuradha Garg
Abstract
Constitutional amendments occupy a critical space in determining the
equilibrium between federalism and central authority, particularly in nations
with pluralistic societies and diverse governance needs. This paper undertakes
a comparative study of India, Canada, and South Africa to evaluate how
constitutional amendment processes have shaped, preserved, or disrupted the
federal balance. India, with its quasi-federal structure, has witnessed
amendments that often tilt toward strengthening parliamentary sovereignty,
thereby sparking judicial scrutiny on the limits of amending power. In
contrast, Canada’s constitutional framework, anchored in both federal supremacy
and provincial autonomy, has evolved through complex negotiations and judicial
interpretations that safeguard decentralization. South Africa, emerging from
apartheid, embodies a unique model where constitutional amendments are
intricately linked to democratic transformation, emphasizing cooperative
governance and judicial oversight to protect fundamental rights and provincial
interests. The comparative analysis highlights that while all three
jurisdictions adopt amendment mechanisms to adapt to political, social, and
economic challenges, the outcomes differ substantially: India’s trajectory
reveals centralizing tendencies mitigated by judicial intervention; Canada
reflects a negotiated balance that occasionally fosters intergovernmental
deadlock; and South Africa demonstrates a rights-based constitutionalism that
reinforces federal cooperation. By employing doctrinal, jurisprudential, and
contextual analysis, this paper argues that the nature of amendment procedures
and the role of the judiciary are decisive in maintaining federal balance.
Further, it underscores that federal stability is less a product of rigid legal
entrenchment and more an outcome of judicial philosophy, political culture, and
the commitment of institutions to constitutional morality. The study thus
provides comparative insights into how constitutional design and amendment
practice can either consolidate or weaken federal arrangements in diverse
democratic contexts.
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Pages:94-102
How to cite this article:
Mazhar Khan, Dr. Anuradha Garg "Constitutional amendments and federal balance: A comparative analysis of India, Canada, and South Africa". International Journal of Law, Policy and Social Review, Vol 7, Issue 3, 2025, Pages 94-102
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