The study analyses the modern concept of Intellectual Property (IP) through the perspective of Indian epistemological traditions, with a focus on the Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya, and Buddhist schools of thought. It argues that the dominant Euro-American model of IP—centered on individual authorship, originality, and proprietary control—rests on ontological and epistemic assumptions that are not universal. Drawing on classical Indian texts, this study explores how these three philosophical systems conceptualize jñāna (knowledge), pramāṇa (valid cognition), and the ethical conditions for knowledge transmission.

The Mīmāṃsā tradition’s notion of apauruṣeya (non-human authorship) of the Vedas positions knowledge as eternal and authorless, foregrounding a model of intellectual commons. Nyāya philosophy, with its emphasis on śabda-pramāṇa (testimony as a valid means of knowledge), constructs a relational view of epistemic authority grounded in reliability rather than originality. In contrast, Buddhist epistemology—rooted in the doctrine of anātman (non-self)—problematizes the very idea of a fixed knowing subject, thereby challenging the conceptual coherence of ownership in relation to knowledge.

Through comparative analysis, the study highlights how these systems collectively offer a non-proprietary, ethically mediated understanding of knowledge that stands in critical contrast to the commodification logic of contemporary IP regimes. The study contributes to decolonial knowledge discourse by suggesting that Indian philosophical traditions provide robust alternatives for reimagining global frameworks of intellectual ownership.