The Tribunals Reforms Act, 2026 creates a National Tribunals Commission (NTC) and gives it a seemingly benign but constitutionally significant function: to review the performance of tribunals and maintain a National Tribunals Data Grid. This paper argues that the new performance-review power should not be treated as ordinary administrative supervision. Tribunals exercise judicial power, and an efficiency regime that rewards disposal numbers, reversal rates or outcome patterns can indirectly influence adjudication as effectively as direct executive control. Drawing on the Supreme Court's tribunal-independence jurisprudence, the 2026 statutory framework, Indian studies on judicial efficiency, and comparative court-performance systems, the paper develops a constitutional distinction between institution-level administration metrics and adjudicator-level decisional metrics. It proposes a three-tier 'independence-compatible performance framework': green metrics that may be published and acted upon; amber metrics that require contextual safeguards; and red metrics that should not be tied to appointment, reappointment, discipline or budgetary consequences. The central claim is that the NTC can become a genuine institutional safeguard only if performance review is designed to measure the conditions of justice rather than the substantive exercise of judicial judgment.