



New partnership for African development and democratic governance in Africa: Past and present objectives, successes and failure

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Abstract

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was established in 2001 as a program of the Organization for African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU). In 2018, the AU assembly recommended the transition of NEPAD to the African Union Development Agency (AUDA), now known as AUDA-NEPAD. AUDA-NEPAD focuses on implementing the AU's Agenda 2063 development strategy, focusing on human capital development, sustainable growth, and women's empowerment. AUDA-NEPAD stands out from previous failed African development programs due to the ownership and commitment of African leaders. A key component of NEPAD initiatives is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which allows African governments to undergo peer review to improve democracy, policy governance, economic governance, corporate governance, and socio-economic development. The APRM's mandate has been extended to monitor the implementation of the African Union Agenda 2063 and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), Agenda 2030. However, the recent surge in military takeovers across Africa, including seven successful coups in 2021-2023, demonstrates the failure of AUDA-NEPAD objectives in ensuring democratic governance. Despite barriers to AUDA-NEPAD's success, much can be done to increase its likelihood of success and achieve a more economically and democratically viable Africa.

Keywords: Democratic governance, Africa Union, Sustainable development, Peer review

Introduction

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was initiated in July 2001 as a program of the Organization for African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU). In 2018, the AU assembly recommended the transition of NEPAD to African Union Development Agency (AUDA). Today, NEPAD is referred to as AUDA-NEPAD. (Hereafter AUDA-NEPAD or NEPAD). AUDA-NEPAD Agency is saddled with the responsibility of implementing the AU's Agenda 2063 development strategy. AUDA-NEPAD primarily has objectives of transforming Africa focusing on facilitating, coordinating the implementation of regional and continental priority development programmes and projects, and pushing for partnership, resources mobilisation and research and knowledge management. The AUDA-NEPAD agency programmes are in the areas of human capital development, placing African countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development, and enhancing its full and beneficial integration into the regional and global economy, and, accelerating the empowerment of women. What makes NEPAD different from previous failed African development programs is the ownership and commitment of African leaders to its success. A key component of NEPAD initiatives is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), whereby African governments voluntarily undergo peer review to demonstrate improvements in democracy and policy governance, economic governance and management, corporate governance and socio-economic development. The mandate of the APRM has been extended to include the monitoring of the implementation of the African Union agenda 2063 and United Nation Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), Agenda 2030. While there are barriers to NEPAD's success, both from within Africa and from external sources, much can be done to increase its likelihood

of success and achieve the end result of a more economically and democratically viable Africa, regardless if the NEPAD program itself continues to exist, or transform completely to Africa Union Development Agency (AUDA) or becomes the impetus and foundation of an African renaissance.

This paper will discuss AUDA-NEPAD and democratic Governance in Africa through the lens of its past and current objectives, successes and failure. To achieve this aim, this paper first looks at NEPAD Historical context by way of analysis of the process that culminated into NEPAD initiative. In a bid to further our understanding of the initiative called NEPAD, the paper examines what is meant by NEPAD and goes forward to list some of its principles and objectives, specific goals and its governance structure and administration. The paper equally looks at the key component of NEPAD, African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) by examining its organisation component. The paper did an analytical exposition of the successes attributable to AUDA-NEPAD as well its failure in terms of the past and present democratic governance crisis as demonstrated by the incessant recent 'military' truncation of democratic government in some part of Africa. The conclusion and recommendations then follow.

Historical context

NEPAD emerged not in a vacuum but as the result of a series of historical circumstances that included the end of colonialism and the first steps towards regional policy integration in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, the structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s, and the end of the Cold War and the democratic reforms in the 1990s. It was formulated on the basis of the successes and failures of earlier attempts at promoting regional policy integration in Africa, such as the creation of the OAU, the Monrovia

commitments, the Lagos Plan of Action, and the Abuja Treaty. NEPAD cannot be isolated from these historical circumstances ^[1]. The earlier NEPAD Document ^[2] acknowledged that:

In Africa, 340 million people, or half the population, live on less than US\$ 1 per day. The mortality rate of children under 5 years of age is 140 per 1000, and life expectancy at birth is only 54 years. Only 58% of the population have access to safe water. The rate of illiteracy for people over 15 is 41% ^[3].

NEPAD was born at a time when the debate about the 'African Renaissance' (African Rebirth) was taking centre stage. It is therefore not accidental that former Presidents Mbeki of South Africa, Obasanjo of Nigeria, and the Algerian counterpart, Bouteflika played a leading role in the drafting of NEPAD. During the preparation of NEPAD and its predecessor proposals, the three former leaders occupied strategic positions, which placed them in a position to present and spearhead a different agenda for the development of Africa. Thabo Mbeki was both the chair of the Non-Align Movement (NAM) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). President Olusegun Obasanjo hosted the G77 Summit around that time while Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria was the chair of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) ^[4].

In 1999 the three leaders were tasked by the Extra-ordinary OAU Summit in Sirtre, Libya, to engage Africa's creditors on the total cancellation of the external African debt. A year later, in April 2000, the three Presidents were tasked by the South Summit in Havana, Cuba, to convey the concerns of the South to the July 2000 G8 Summit in Okinawa, Japan ^[5]. The OAU summit in Togo in July 2000 also mandated the three Presidents to prepare a comprehensive proposal on Africa's Recovery Programme that would serve as a working document for the OAU Summit of Heads of State and Government scheduled to take place in Lusaka, Zambia, in July 2001. The efforts of these three African leaders resulted in the Millennium African Recovery Programme (MAP) which Thabo Mbeki presented to World Economic Forum Meeting in Davos, Switzerland as a 'declaration of a firm commitment by African leaders to take ownership and responsibility for the sustainable economic development of the continent' ^[6].

NEPAD is in fact a merger of the Millennium Africa Recovery Plan (MAP) proposed by Mbeki of South Africa, President Obasanjo of Nigeria, and Bouteflika of Algeria and the Omega Plan proposed by President Wade of Senegal. At the 37th OAU Summit held in July 2001 in Lusaka, MAP and the Omega plan were merged and the resulting African development programme became known as the New African Initiative (NAI). In July 2002, NAI was presented to the G8 in Genoa and was endorsed. On 23rd October 2001, NAI's policy framework was agreed to by the Heads of State Implementation Committee at Abuja and the name was changed to the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) ^[7].

What is AUDA-NEPAD?

As already mentioned, the AU assembly recommended in 2018 for the transition of NEPAD to African Union Development Agency (AUDA). Today, NEPAD is referred

to as AUDA-NEPAD. The first paragraph in the earlier NEPAD document describes NEPAD as follows:

This New Partnership for Africa's Development [NEPAD] is a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development, and at the same time to participate actively in the world economy and body politic. The Programme is anchored on the determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalising world ^[8].

In light of the above, AUDA-NEPAD's overall aim can thus be summed up as 'a commitment by African leaders to place the continent on an accelerated path of social, technological, economic and democratic development'.

Furthermore, NEPAD in the past has been portrayed severally by its supporters ^[9] as: a holistic, comprehensive integrated strategic framework for the socio-economic development of Africa. It includes a vision for Africa, a statement of the problems facing the continent and a programme of action to resolve these problems in order to reach the vision; a plan that has been conceived and developed by African leaders; a commitment that African leaders are making to African people and to the international community, to place Africa on a path of sustainable growth; a commitment Africa leaders are making to accelerate the integration of the African continent into the global economy; and a framework for a new partnership between Africa and the rest of the world ^[10].

Principles and Objectives of AUDA-NEPAD

As earlier mentioned, AUDA-NEPAD has the primary objectives of transforming Africa focusing on facilitating, coordinating the implementation of regional and continental priority development programmes and projects, and pushing for partnership, resources mobilisation and research and knowledge management. The NEPAD agency programmes are in the areas of ensuring African ownership, responsibility and leadership; Making Africa attractive to both domestic and foreign investors; unleashing the vast economic potential of the continent; ensuring that the continent achieves the agreed United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 2030; increasing investment in human resources and capital development; promoting the role of women in all activities; promoting sub-regional and continental economic integration; developing a new partnership with industrialised countries and multilateral organisations on the basis of mutual commitments, obligations, interest, contributions and benefits; ensuring that there is a capacity to accelerate the implementation of major regional development co-operation agreements and projects already approved or in the pipeline; and strengthening Africa's capacity to mobilise additional external resources for its development ^[11].

In recent time, the AUDA-NEPAD Agency is saddled with the responsibility of implementing the AU's Agenda 2063 development strategy. Agenda 2063 is the blueprint and master plan for transforming Africa into the global powerhouse of the future. It is the strategic framework for the delivering on African's goal for inclusive and

‘sustainable development and is a concrete manifestation of the pan-African drive for unity, self-determination, freedom, progress and collective prosperity pursued under Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance ^[12].’

The (governance) structure and administration of AUDA-NEPAD

It is of important to reiterate that the 37th OAU Summit in Lusaka, Zambia in July 2001 adopted the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), as the integrated and comprehensive socio-economic development programme to accelerate Africa's renewal, in the form of Declaration 1 (XXXVII). The Lusaka Summit agreed on the creation of the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC), which in turn established the NEPAD Steering Committee and the NEPAD Secretariat to coordinate and administer its activities.

In line with the integration of NEPAD into the structures and processes of the AU, the 14th AU Summit held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in February 2010, strengthened the NEPAD programme by transforming the NEPAD secretariat into an implementation Agency - the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NEPAD Agency). It is also in this regard that the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) was transformed into the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee (HSGOC). In addition, the Summit authorised the Chairperson of the African Union Commission to exercise supervisory authority over the AUDA-NEPAD Agency ^[13].

The AUDA-NEPAD governance structures are now:

1. The Assembly of the African Union (AU)
2. The Heads of State & Government Orientation Committee (HSGOC)
3. The Steering Committee (SC)

At the inception of NEPAD, the structure of the Heads of State & Government Orientation Committee (HSGOC) consists of 15 states divided into 3 states per OAU region including the 5 initiating states (i.e. South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Senegal and Egypt). To promote inclusiveness and inspire ownership within Africa, HSGOC membership has been enlarged to 33-member State sub-committee of the AU Assembly of head of state and government that provides the highest political leadership and strategic guidance on Agenda 2063 priority issues and report its recommendations to the full assembly for endorsement ^[14].

The HSGOC meets at least two times per year at summits held back-to-back with the African Union summits. The last meeting was the 40th session of HSGCO and was held in February 2023. The HSGOC reviews progress and take decisions on strategic issues and reports to the AU Summit, through its chairperson. The current Chairperson of the AUDA-NEPAD HSGOC is president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt who took over after President Paul Kagame of Kenya upon conclusion of his term in February 2023 ^[15]. The Secretary General are ex-officio members of the Implementation Committee, and the AU Secretariat participates in the Steering Committee meetings.

The Steering Committee is an intermediary body to interface between HSGOC and AUDA-NEPAD, which oversees the activities of the AUDA-NEPAD. The committee is composed of the personal representatives of Heads of States and Government of the HSGOC. In

addition, representatives from eight AU- recognised Regional Economic Communities (RECS), the AUC, African Development Bank (AfDB), UN Development Programme (UNDP), UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (UNOSAN) and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) participate in AUDA-NEPAD Steering Committee meetings as observers ^[16].

AUDA-NEPAD also established a number of Task Teams and Sub-Committees. Task Teams are mandated to develop specific detailed implementable projects and programmes in the priority areas identified. The five Task Teams are:

1. Capacity building for peace and security - AU as the lead agency
2. Economic and corporate governance - ECA as the lead agency
3. Infrastructure - AfDB as the lead agency
4. Central bank and financial standards
5. Agriculture and market access - AU as lead agency ^[17].

The sub-committees on the other hand are mandated to coordinate certain thematic initiatives. The five Sub - Committees are;

1. Peace, Security, Democracy and Political Governance - co-ordinated by South Africa
2. Economic and Corporate Governance/Banking and Financial Standards/ Capital Flows - co-ordinated by Nigeria
3. Market Access and Agriculture - co-ordinated by Egypt
4. Human resources development - co-ordinated by Algeria
5. Infrastructure - co-ordinated by Senegal ^[18].

Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) – A short description.

The aspect of the NEPAD base proposal that elicited most interest is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The proposal for a ‘mutually agreed instrument for self-monitoring ^[19]’ was initially mooted at the first meeting of the NEPAD HSGIC in Abuja in October 2001 ^[20]. The base document ^[21] of the APRM was then endorsed by the AU States at the Durban Summit of July 2002 ^[22]. The APRM is a voluntary mechanism open to all member states of the African Union. The mechanism is mandated to ensure that the policies and practices of participating States conform to agree political, economic and corporate governance values, codes and standards contained in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance (Declaration on Governance) ^[23]. The declared purpose of the APRM is to:

... foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration through sharing of experiences and reinforcement of successful and best practice, including identifying deficiencies and assessing the needs for capacity building ^[24].

Initially ^[25], it was planned that the peer review process be initiated in one of three ways: The first involves an initial assessment to become familiar with the current level of governance in a particular country and a consideration of possible plans for the future, which initial review is then followed by a further review two years later; the second is a

one-off special assessment initiated at the request of a particular country; and, the third is a special review initiated by the APR Forum in anticipation of an impending crisis [26].

Eighteen months after a country becomes a member of the APRM process it must submit to a base review, followed by mandatory reviews which take place between three and five years thereafter. The APRM also provides for ad hoc reviews under special circumstances. The review process itself consists of five stages as part of a consultative, not a punitive, process. The first stage of desk research followed by country consultations will draw heavily on the UNECA Governance project to provide the background on the key governance and development issues. Thereafter the peer review process follows two tracks, one that covers economic and corporate governance issues and the other dealing with political governance issues [27]. It is clear that NEPAD is premised on the need for improved democratic, political, economic and corporate governance and an end to conflict as preconditions for sustainable economic growth.

AUDA-NEPAD: Past and Current Successes and Failure

The NEPAD initiative has elicited more jurisprudential ink both in local and international intellectual discuss [28]. No doubt, the idea of proposing a comprehensive development programme for Africa is a noble move. However, there are certainly areas the initiative has failed to measure up to Africans expectations. Before delving further on the negatives, it is essential to first highlight some of the positive aspects of AUDA-NEPAD.

The AUDA-NEPAD project does not only focus on the solutions that will be provided by African leaders and governments but also invites the African populace to be part of the process. AUDA-NEPAD admits that political solutions alone, which are often remote from the preferred solutions of ordinary people, will not solve the continent's problems. AUDA-NEPAD values the role of the non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as partners in sustainable development. In the same token, it recognises that Africa needs to negotiate a new relationship with her development partners and that the African continent has been 'plundered for centuries' and must now 'take its rightful place in the world'. Furthermore, through the proposed adherence to 'good governance', the initiatives try to lay a basis on which many of the human rights abuses, mostly by African leaders, can be brought to the lime light (though not to book). More so, through AUDA-NEPAD, there is a radical shift from just blaming all the problems the continent is facing on colonialism but rather to now realise our collective responsibility in re-building the continent and its people [29].

If AUDA-NEPAD is seen as part of an ongoing process of regional policy integration, it can be credited with placing democracy and good governance at the centre of Africa's development agenda as conditions for sustainable development. The Monrovia commitments and the Lagos Plan of Action introduced the ideas of regional integration, self-reliance, and institution building. The Abuja Treaty consolidated these ideas. NEPAD placing democracy and good governance at the centre of Africa's development agenda as conditions for sustainable development is epitomized by the adoption of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance in 2007. Such a move would not be questioned today, but this was not the

case many years ago when the Monrovia commitments were made and the Lagos Plan of Action was adopted [30].

Also, in the context of ongoing regional policy integration, AUDA-NEPAD should be credited, at least partially, with placing Africa's development challenges at the centre of the EU's and other countries external relations agenda. Africa has been a focus of European foreign policy aspirations for hundreds of years, but it is only within the last few decades that it has gained prominence on that agenda. The reasons for this arguably include the risks and consequences of state failure, increased economic interests in Africa, and transnational challenges such as migration and climate change [31].

The importance of the launch of NEPAD cannot be underestimated. Foreign direct investments to Africa tripled despite the global financial crisis of the 2000's, partly due to an increasingly investment-friendly environment [32]. Together with the past Millennium Summit in New York in 2000 and the G8 summits in Kananaskis, Canada in 2002 and Gleneagles, Scotland in 2005, NEPAD has arguably contributed to this – and to the growing recognition that Africa's problems must be addressed and that the international community, including the EU, has an important role to play in addressing them [33].

What is clear is that the initial NEPAD document is overt in its acknowledgement that the bane of Africa's development over the years has been mainly that of poor, incompetent and corrupt leadership, as well as western exploitation of African resources. Given this context, the document states that '...colonialism subverted hitherto traditional structures, institutions and values or made them subservient to the economic and political needs of the imperial powers. It also retarded the development of an entrepreneurial class, as well as a middle class with skills and managerial capacity... [thus] post-colonial Africa inherited weak states and dysfunctional economies aggravated by poor leadership, corruption and bad governance in many countries [34].'

Having identified the above as the bane of African development over the years, the question is, has AUDA-NEPAD succeeded in addressing this core issues? Although, AUDA-NEPAD is an ongoing process, there are noted areas of failure/shortcomings. In examining this failure, albeit to further a better understanding of it, this paper approach it from the angle of democratic governance crisis as bane of African development.

Democratic Governance Crisis in Africa: A test for AUDA-NEPAD

NEPAD initiative gives high priorities to conflict prevention, as well as democracy and good political governance as essential ingredient for African renewal. Indeed, giving African past and even current experience, there is no doubt that the achievement of substantial poverty reduction and sustainable development will depend importantly on ensuring peace, security, human rights and good governance throughout the continent. Hence, the APRM initiatives under NEPAD. However, NEPAD peer review mechanism through which African leaders monitor each other's performance with regard to good governance obligations set out in NEPAD is one half too many. At the Conference on the African Renaissance in September 1998, President Mbeki said:

...we assume a stance of opposition to dictatorship, whatever form it may assume. Thus, we say that we must ensure that when elections are held, these must be truly democratic, resulting in governments which the people would accept as being genuinely representative of the will of the people ^[35].

This commitment had undergone a serious test in various part of Africa in the past. The first of it was in Zimbabwe, especially during the then highly disputed presidential elections of 2002 which ensured President Robert Mugabe another five-year term in office. The African elite club chose to ignore questions of governance, corruption, violence and allegations of vote rigging and was quick to declare the elections as free and fair. Open violence and intimidation, expulsion of foreign journalists, change of electoral rules on the eve of elections, verbal attacks and interference in the work of the judiciary, attacks on the independent media all which accompanied the elections were ignored by African governments. South Africa, which is one of the lead proponent of NEPAD, was one of the first to declare the elections as free and fair whilst SADC parliamentarians and other election monitors said the exact opposite.

The past and current surge of crisis in some part of Africa is an attestation to the failure of NEPAD - APRM in achieving its objective. Tunisia is the springboard of what the world was refers to as the Arab revolution. The underlying factor for the uprising could be attributed to high level poverty, gross human rights violations and bad governance in some of this area. The Egyptian revolution saw the ousting of one of the longest serving ruler (Housni Mubarak) from power. Mubarak, much more an avid participant in the NEPAD initiative that comes to birth in 2001. Maumur Gadafi of Libya was another African leader that the Arab Uprising swept away. Though, one could not undermine the influence of western power play, the underlying fact still remain that NEPAD with its APRM component stands as a by stander and watch these rulers autocratic reign, until the populace of these country through revolution ousted these rulers from office. The past crisis in Mali, Sudan, DR Congo and the Central African Republic (CAR) ^[36] underscore lack of good governance on the part of this African Leaders.

The recent surge in military takeover across African with a total of about seven successful coups within two years (2021 - 2023) is an indication of the current failure of AUDA-NEPAD objectives of ensuring and fostering democratic governance. For example, Mali has witnessed two coups in 9 months. The Malian democratically elected president Ibrahim Boubacar Kieta was overthrown by the military on August 18, 2020, a transitional government was formed in October same year. Later on, May 24, 2021, the Malian Military arrested the new President and the Prime minister. A colonel Assimi Goita was inaugurated in June 2021 as transitional president to return the country to civilian democratic government after the election scheduled for February 2024 ^[37]. Similarly, in Guinea, on September 5, 2021, democratic elected President Alpha Conde was overthrown by a military coup and Colonel Mamady Doumbouya became the president on October 1, 2021 to return the country to democratic elected civilian government by the end of 2024.

In the same token, Soldiers led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhane in Sudan ousted the transitional Civilian leaders, who were to lead the country towards democracy after 30 years of dictatorship of Omar al-Bashir, himself deposed in 2019. Since April 15, 2023, Sudan has been in a state of war between General Burhane and his former deputy Mohamed Hamdane Daglo which has killed at least 5, 000 people in the country ^[38].

Burkina Faso is another African country that have witnessed two Military takeovers in 8 months. The first, which ousted democratic elected president Roch Marc Christian Kabore from office by the Burkina Faso military. Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba was inaugurated as president in February. The second coup was on September 30, which in turn ousted Damiba from power by the same Military. Captain Ibrahim Traore was instituted as a transitional president until a democratic presidential election scheduled for July 2024 ^[39].

The latest in the spite of military coups in Africa is that of the Niger Republic where the Military announced on July 26, 2023 that they have overthrown the democratically elected President Mohammed Bazoum. A General Abdourahamane Tiani becomes the military president of the country. The Niger Military proposes a transition period of 'three years' maximum before returning to democratic elected governance ^[40].

The several military truncations of democratic governance in Africa attest to the continuous failure of AUDA-NEPAD primary and secondary objectives of good democratic governance in Africa. The challenge about NEPAD and the concept of peer review is who has the moral high ground of saying what against whom? The sad reality is that most of the current, as well as past African leaders do not have the moral high ground that would allow them to throw stones at each other or anyone else. Most sit in a glass house of their own. In West African, for example, most countries are battling serious political, economic and social issues such as high inflations, terrorism, kidnapping and corruption that calls for a credibility test of their government leadership. Ditto in some Northern and Southern African countries ^[41]. We can only conclude, that all contained in the AUDA-NEPAD APRM document is merely 'false expectations' of what it will be able to achieve, since it does not have any substantive punitive authority over countries with poor governance standards. Its value could be tagged as a 'socializing tool' to popularize and encourage the spread of good governance practices.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The AUDA-NEPAD is a product of the continuing search by African people and its leaders to create Pan-African structures that can lead to the social and economic transformation of the continent in a rapidly 'globalising world.' Agenda 2063 development strategy of the AUDA-NEPAD is the blueprint and master plan for transforming Africa into the global powerhouse of the future. It is the strategic framework for the delivering on African's goal for inclusive and 'sustainable development and is a concrete manifestation of the Pan-African drive for unity, self-determination, freedom, progress and collective prosperity pursued under Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance.' While the initiative has achieved considerably in its own rights over the years, its failure in terms of Africa economic development and democratic good governance far override

the intentions behind the initiative. It should be recognized that AUDA-NEPAD is not a stand-alone programme but part of an ongoing process of regional policy integration in Africa. It is in this light, that the way forward becomes plausible.

First, military truncations of democratic governance under any guise is unacceptable anywhere in Africa. AUDA-NEPAD through its strong organizations mechanisms must be alive to its primary and secondary objectives of good democratic governance in Africa. Military coup must be strongly opposed and condemned. Heavy sanctions must be imposed on every coup plotter if necessary to serve as deterrence for future occurrence.

Furthermore, true African unity is a prerequisite to any partnership initiative. If African countries, divided by colonial borders, do not think and act beyond the confines of those borders, any partnership among Africans or between Africa and the industrialised world is doomed to fail. The same vigour with which the continent united against a common enemy – colonialism should inspire Africans to unite and challenge neo-colonialism, globalisation and the hegemonic behaviour of some industrialised countries.

Good governance is an important part of a sound institutional environment which is essential for many other reforms areas. Today, the clamour for democratization and good governance is on the increase in Africa. African leaders must accept and comply with the wishes of those whom they represent. The free choice of leaders by the governed is the essence of representative government which the existence of AUDA-NEPAD strives to and must guarantee. If institutions are weak, policies are also likely to be weak. In general, good governance and well-functioning institution provides enabling environment for private initiative and allow for a more efficient use of resources hence sustainable development. Policy reforms in economic and governance will bring about AUDA-NEPAD Agenda 2063 full gains if the institutional framework is appropriate.

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29. See African Security Review, Editorial, (n 19) p. 9.
 30. *ibid.* at pp. 9- 10.
 31. See Bradley Andrew, 'The European Union and Challenges to Democracy Building in Africa', (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2009) at p. 52.
 32. See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2008: Transnational Corporations and the Infrastructure Challenge (New York and Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2008) at p.38. As at July 2012, foreign investment to African is down for third year running. See <http://unctad.org/en/pages/DIA/world%20investment%20report/WIR2012_webflyer.aspx> accessed on 3rd January 2013.
 33. See Loxley John, 'Imperialism and Economic Reform in Africa: What's New about the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)?', *Review of African Political Economy*, 30/95 (2003), pp. 119–128.
 34. See DFA, NEPAD historical Overview, (n 10).
 35. See Tailor I, 'Zimbabwe and the Death of NEPAD' 2002, In Bond, P (ed.) Fanon's Warning: A civil society reader on the New Partnership for Africa's Development, (New Jersey: Africa World Press, Inc, 2002, 68-72.
 36. As at December 2012, the rebel in CAR advance so close to the capital Bangui and the then government of Francios Bozize was under threat of capitulation that moment. As seen and listen to by the author on Aljazeera news of 30th December, 2012 on DSTV. See also The Nation Newspaper of December 31, 2012, p. 56.
 37. See Africa: the 7 military coups over the last three years. By Redaction Africanews with AFP 30th August, 2023, available at <<http://www.africanews.com/2023/08/30/Africa-the-7-military-coups-over-the-last-three-years/>> accessed on 19th November, 2023.
 38. *ibid*
 39. *ibid*
 40. *Ibid.* See also Timeline of recent coups in Africa, by Okiki Adeduyite, Punch newspaper 30th August 2023, available at <<http://punchng.com/timeline-of-recent-coups-in-africa/>> accessed on 19th November, 2023.
 41. As at November, 2012, President Mohammed Morsi of Egypt ascribes to himself executive power without judicial oversight. That single act of Mohammed Morsi caused widespread protest throughout Egypt which led to what today is known as the Arab spring. As listen and seen by the author on Aljazeera News of 15th November, 2012 on DSTV.